When the central bank is the sole policymaker, the combination of limited asset market participation and consumption habits can have dramatic implications for the optimal monetary policy rule and for stability properties of a business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities. In this framework, a simple countercyclical …scal rule plays a twofold role. On the one hand it ensures uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium when monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule. On the other hand it brings aggregate dynamics substantially closer to their socially e¢ cient levels.
Introduction
The standard New-Keynesian framework is characterized by optimizing agents and by a number of nominal and real frictions in goods, labor and …nancial markets. Following a seminal contribution by Mankiw (2000) , a second strand of New Keynesian literature emphasizes the role of rule-of-thumb consumers (RT consumers henceforth) who do not participate to …nancial markets and therefore cannot save or borrow. Erceg Critics of the approach might argue that the empirical relevance of RT consumers is bound to gradually decline along with the development of …nancial markets (Bilbiie, Meier and Müller, 2008) . In fact, increasing regulation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis (OECD 2009 ) is likely to raise the share of liquidity-constrained households in the near future.
The RT consumers hypothesis has triggered a controversy about the properties that simple and implementable interest rate rules must ful…ll in order to guarantee the uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium and to maximize the social welfare. Earlier contributions, based on the representative, optimizing agent framework emphasize the importance of satisfying the Taylor principle (Woodford, 2003; Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe 2004, 2007) . By contrast Bilbiie (2008) shows that, in a world of ‡exible nominal wages, a low elasticity of labor supply combined with a su¢ ciently large share of constrained agents leads to an equilibrium where an interest rate policy based on the Taylor principle cannot ensure model determinacy. Colciago (2007) downplays this conclusion: he …nds that even a mild degree of wage stickiness dampens the sensitivity of RT consumption to shocks and restores the standard Taylor Principle even for a very large share of RT consumers. In addition, Ascari et al.(2010) show that the optimal monetary policy, i.e. the optimal in ‡ation coe¢ cient in the interest rate rule, is almost una¤ected by the presence of RT consumers when nominal wages are sticky.
In this paper we show that -just like wage stickiness undermines the RT consumers e¤ect outlined in Bilbiie -other frictions may weaken the sensitivity of optimizing agents' consumption decisions to the interest rate rule. In fact, this happens when consumption habits enter the utility function. In modern New Keynesian business cycle models consumption habits are relied on to explain movements in aggregate consumption data and to generate the "hump-shaped" impulse responses widely recognized to characterize the responses of output and consumption to demand and supply shocks (see Dennis 2009 and references therein). In our model the combination of consumption habits and RT consumers has dramatic implications for model determinacy, resurrecting Bilbiie's inverted Taylor principle for empirically plausible values of the RT consumers share. In addition, the central bank optimal reaction to in ‡ation is far stronger than in Ascari et al. (2010) .
Having con…rmed that RT consumers potentially have important policy implications when the central bank is the sole policymaker, we then consider the impact of …scal policies on the necessary conditions for equilibrium determinacy and on the features of the optimal monetary policy rule. Research on simple optimal monetary policy rules under limited asset market participation has ignored the simultaneous role played by …scal policy. In models based on full asset market participation this may be justi…ed by the …ndings in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) who show that optimal …scal rules should simply ensure debt solvency. In our context the limited asset market participation hypothesis paves the way for an additional role of …scal policy, because tax reactions to temporary shocks may stabilize consumption decisions of RT households.
The …scal rules we consider are akin to the so-called automatic stabilizers, i.e. those elements of …scal policy which react to the business cycle without requiring discretionary …scal policy action. Automatic stabilizers characterize modern market economies and their working is typically associated to a reduction in the volatility We …nd that our …scal rules have strong implications for dynamic stability: the Taylor principle is restored even for economies characterized by a relatively large amount of RT consumers. By contrast, the introduction of the …scal rules does not change our former result that RT consumers require a much stronger sensitivity of the interest rate rule to in ‡ation. Finally, all the …scal rules considered here have a welfare-improving e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model . In section 3 we analyze determinacy and the robustness of the results under alternative calibrations. In section 4 we investigate the performance on simple optimal monetary and …scal rules. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a cashless DSGE model where nominal rigidities are characterized by the Calvo formalism.
Following Galì et al (2004 and 2007) , households are characterized by the same utility function, but we draw a distinction between the fraction of RT consumers and the (1 ) Ricardian agents who have unrestricted access to …nancial markets and . The key di¤erence between the two groups concerns intertemporal consumption optimization, which is precluded to households who have no access to …nancial markets.
Households preferences
Preferences are de…ned as follows.
where i : o; rt stands for the household type (Ricardian and RT consumers respectively), is the discount factor, C 
The aggregate consumption price index is
and demand for good z is
Finally, we de…ne i t as the marginal utility of consumption
Ricardian Households
Ricardian households maximize (1) subject to the following period budget constraint:
In each time period t Ricardian agents can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal payment Q t+1 in period t + 1 at the dollar cost E t t;t+1 Q t+1 . The variable t;t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor between period t and t + 1. Real dividends are denoted by D t , while B t is the quantity of nominally riskless bonds purchased in period t at price R 1 t and paying one unit of the consumption numeraire at period t + 1.
P t S t represents nominal lump sum taxes.
The solution for the optimizing household problem is standard. The Euler equation is
The stochastic discount factor is de…ned as E t t;t+1 = E t o t+1
Pt+1
Pt o t and absence of arbitrage pro…ts in the asset markets implies that E t t;t+1 = R 1 t .
Rule-of-Thumb Households
As pointed out above, RT consumers neither save or borrow, in each period they entirely consume their labor income net of taxes.
Firms
Good z is produced in monopolistically competitive markets with the following technology:
Where ln a t = a ln a t 1 + " t de…nes a technology process. For any given level of its labor demand h t (z), the optimal allocation of labor inputs implies
where
is the standard wage index. Firm z's real marginal costs are:
Pt is the real wage and is a production subsidy.
Sticky Prices
In each period …rm z faces a probability 1 p of being able to reoptimize its price. All the 1 p …rms which reoptimizeat time t will face symmetrical conditions and set the same e P t , chosen to maximize a discounted sum of expected future pro…ts:
s t+s e P t P t+s mc t+s y t+s (z) subject to:
where Y d t+s is aggregate demand. e P t solves the following …rst order condition
where p = ( 1) de…nes the markup chosen under ‡exible prices.
Labor market
Each labor market j is monopolistically competitive and there is a union j which sets the nominal wage, W j t , subject to (7) . Each household i supplies all labour types at the given wage rates 1 and the total number of hours allocated to the di¤erent labor markets must satisfy the time resource constraint
As in Galì (2007), we assume that the fraction of RT and Ricardian consumers is uniformly distributed across unions, and demand for each labour type is uniformly distributed across households. Ricardian and non-Ricardian households therefore work for the same amount of time, h t . We posit that the representative union objective function is a weighted average (1 ; ) of the utility functions of the two households types.
This, in turn, implies that with ‡exible wages
where w = w ( w 1) represents the wage markup.
Sticky wages
In each period a union faces a constant probability (1 w ) of being able to reoptimize the nominal wage.
Unions that cannot reoptimize simply set their wages equal to the one in the previous period.
Following Colciago (2006) , the representative union objective function is de…ned as
The relevant constraints are (4), (6), (11) .
The nominal wage f W t solves the following …rst order condition
Government sector
We make the assumption of an e¢ cient steady state in order to study the welfare properties of the economy without resorting to a second-order approximation to the equations of the model. We therefore posit that the production subsidy brings production at the competitive level. The real wage in the zero-in ‡ation steady state equilibrium is
Since M P L = 1 must hold at the e¢ cient steady state, the optimal subsidy is 
and both consumption and the marginal rate of substitution are identical for the two consumer groups.
As pointed out in the introduction, the RT consumers assumption paves the way for …scal stabilization policies. To keep complications at a minimum, we neglect government supply of public goods and assume that …scal policy is based on a lump-sum tax, S t , which is levied on households. 3 The government's ‡ow budget constraint is then given by
The features of S t are discussed in section (3.1) below. It su¢ ces here to state that in good times the …scal policymaker builds up a "rainy days" fund to be used in the face of adverse shocks. 4 
Aggregate resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
2.6 The model in log-linear form
Hatted letters denote log deviations from the steady state.
Household i marginal utility of consumption
Euler equationĉ
RT consumptionĉ
Aggregate consumptionĉ 3 We have also controlled for suppy side e¤ects of the rule by modelling S as a labor income tax. Our conclusions are fully con…rmed (results available upon request). 4 Therefore it would be straightforward to show that optimizing consumers would not react to cyclical variations of taxes.
Production functionŷ
Aggregate resource constraintŷ
Marginal costs
Phillips Curve^
Wage-setting condition
Public debt dynamicsb
Policy rules
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor Rule
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), we neglect cyclical adjustments of public consumption and de…ne our …scal rule as a feedback that reacts to aggregate nominal income growth:
Condition (26) 6 is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that the primary balance in the OECD economies is more sensitive to output growth than to the output gap ( (Immervoll, 2003; Tanzi 1980 ). We shall also consider restricted versions of (26), wherê s reacts to either real income growth or to the output gap. To ensure stability of the debt accumulation process the …scal rule includes a feedback on past debt accumulation. Without consumption habits, i.e. when we set b = 0, our model replicates this latter result even if …scal policy is switched o¤. By contrast, under our calibration of b determinacy requires an inversion of the Taylor principle when > 0:42 when …scal policy is inactive (Figure 1 ). The rationale for this result is straightforward: from (17) it is easy to see that consumption habits reduce the sensitivity of Ricardian consumers to real interest rate changes, weakening the substitution e¤ect that is crucial to obtain determinacy under the Taylor principle. 
Sensitivity analysis
The threshold value that triggers an inversion of the Taylor principle is crucially a¤ected by three key parameters, i.e. the degrees of price and nominal wage stickiness, respectively p and w , and consumption habits b. Empirical DSGE models yield quite di¤erent estimates for these parameters. 
The …scal rule and the taylor principle
The …scal rule has substantial implications for dynamic stability (Figure 4 ). For instance, the Taylor principle holds irrespective of the size of when s = 0:55. The …gure also shows that the …scal policy e¤ects would be weaker if, instead of reacting to nominal income growth, the tax feedback targeted either real output growth or the current output gap. To understand our results one should bear in mind that in this class of models the Taylor principle fails to achieve determinacy when it cannot prevent a self-ful…lling expectation in the growth of pro…ts (see our discussion above). Thus …scal rules should be e¤ective to the extent they indirectly stabilize pro…ts by limiting the "Keynesian multiplier e¤ect" of RT consumers. The e¤ect of the …scal rules is clearly shown in …gure 5, where we plot the dynamics of pro…ts in response to a productivity shock when = 0:4 and = 0:45. A fortiori, the stronger complementarity with the monetary rule explains why the …scal feedback on nominal income growth is more e¤ective than the rule targeting real output growth. 9 In the simulations we set s = 0:4, = 1:5. In the right-hand-side panel we do not plot the IRF for the case in which …scal policy is switched o¤, because for > 0:42 monetary policy alone is not su¢ cient to guarantee determinacy under the Taylor principle.
Optimal simple monetary and …scal policy rules
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal simple policy rules, subject to the determinacy constraints of the model. The …rst step in our analysis is the identi…cation of the solution to the social planner problem.
The social planner problem
The social planner problem can be characterized as:
subject to:
By assumption, the two household groups have symmetrical preferences, but RT consumers have no access to …nancial markets. As a result, from the social planner perspective both consumption and worked hours should be identical for the two groups. In addition, the social planner faces an intertemporal problem due to internal habit formation, which a¤ects socially optimal dynamics in response to shocks. It is easy to demonstrate that the log-linear solutions to the social planner problem are (b c
; b w t = b a t , and 
We derive the second order approximation to (27) around the e¢ cient steady state, and then re-express it as deviations from the solutions to the social planner problem outlined above, obtaining the discounted value of the Central Bank loss function: 
Optimal interest rate rule without …scal stabilization
The optimization problem consists in deriving the strength of the policy parameter , which minimizes (28) subject to the behavior of households, wage setters and …rms in response to a technology shock. In analogy The optimal in ‡ation coe¢ cient in (25) rapidly grows with (Figure 7) . 13 For instance, 14 Thus, the combination of consumption habits and RT consumers is necessary to obtain . From (29) we know that the policymaker is concerned with consumption utility gaps. Without habits, di¤erences in consumption utility among the two groups are relatively unimportant. With habits, incomplete stabilization of pro…t gaps generates stronger and more persistent di¤erences in consumption utilities. As a result, wage adjustment costs become relatively less important and the anti-in ‡ation policy becomes more aggressive. In addition, from (5), (3), (15) it is clear that the combination of RT consumers and consumption habits strongly reduces the aggregate demand elasticity to interest rate changes. 1 2 This choice is justi…ed by the idea that rules characterized by stronger interest rate reaction to changes in in ‡ation are di¢ cult to communicate to the public and therefore unlikely to be implemented in practice (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007). 1 3 As soon as reaches the 0:42 threshold, coe¢ cient switches to the lower bound. 1 4 The increase in from 2:4 to 3:9 is caused by the habit-induced reduction in the sensitivity of consumption to the real interest rate (see (17) When looking at di¤erences relative to the social planner's response (…gure 8b) we …nd that monetary policy can close gaps in total consumption (output) and worked hours when all agents optimize. By contrast, negative gaps in output and worked hours cannot be avoided when = 0:3. 
Optimal …scal and monetary rules
In …gure 9a we plot the IRFs under di¤erent the …scal rules. Coe¢ cients and s are chosen to minimize (28) conditional to the fact that the …scal rule alternatively controls nominal income growth, real income growth and the current output gap (Rules 1,2,3 respectively in Table 2 ). All the …scal rules reduce welfare Given the widespread consensus about the ine¢ cient use of discretionary …scal policies in a large number of countries (Alesina et al., 2008) , it might be sound to preserve the role of automatic stabilizers.
Our results also sound a note of caution, suggesting that …scal rules should be carefully designed. Further research should therefore investigate the optimal design of automatic stabilizers in medium-scale models, accounting for both a richer set of tax instruments and countercyclical public consumption expenditure.
Appendix A Welfare-based Loss Function
The derivation of (28) Given the e¢ ciency of the steady state in our model, we have that:
where U i h and U i C are the steady state derivatives of the agent i utility function with respect to hours, h or consumption, C respectively.
As in Bilbiie (2008) we assume that the Central Bank maximizes a convex combination of the utilities of two types of households, weighted by their mass in the economy, i.e.:
We start by assuming a generic CRRA utility for agent i at period t function as 
A second order approximation of U (X 
